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THE PROSECUTOR IN THE MIRROR:
CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNITS AND BRADY
CLAIMS
Lissa Griffin & Daisy Mason
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor
has a due process obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt or punishment. The failure to fulfill this duty is particularly
insidious because it bears directly on both whether an innocent defendant may have been convicted as well as on whether the adjudicatory process was fair. The failure to disclose exculpatory evidence has been characterized as “epidemic” and has been documented to have made a major,
outsized contribution in cases that resulted in exonerations. It is not surprising, then, that conviction integrity units in prosecutor’s offices
(CIUs)—departments or bureaus created to entertain claims of wrongful
conviction—often must confront allegations of such wrongdoing by trial
prosecutors who work or have worked in their own offices. This Article
analyzes the CIU investigation and review processes and the complications they present and explores the ethical obligations of a CIU that concludes that a Brady violation has occurred.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 1993: twenty-one-year-old Chester
Hollman III is convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to
life without parole for the shooting death of Tae Jung Ho.1 Twentyfive years later, in 2018, Hollman’s attorney and the Pennsylvania Innocence Project request a meeting with Philadelphia District Attorney
Larry Krasner’s newly appointed Conviction Integrity Unit (CIU) to
persuade the Unit to reinvestigate Hollman’s case.2 The CIU accepts
and, as a result of providing Hollman his case files, Hollman’s attorney discovers that the trial prosecutor had suppressed exculpatory evidence.3 Based on the exculpatory evidence, the CIU joined Hollman’s
request to vacate the conviction.4
What the CIU had discovered was that the trial prosecutor, Roger
King, had not revealed to the defense that he had evidence that linked
three other suspects to the crime.5 One of these alternative suspects,
Denise Combs, had been identified by an anonymous caller as a suspect within 24 hours of the murder.6 She was investigated by police
but only in an attempt to link her to their initial suspect—Hollman.7
Once that effort failed, they abandoned Combs as a suspect.8 The CIU
conceded that the prosecutor had enough evidence to allow their office
to successfully prosecute the real perpetrators.9 Ultimately, on July 30,
2019, after serving twenty-eight years in prison for a crime he did not
commit, Hollman was exonerated.10 Meanwhile, despite his

1. Chester Hollman III, PA. INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://painnocence.org/chesterhollman
[https://perma.cc/D63R-PP6G].
2. Philadelphia Exoneree Chester Hollman Featured in Netflix Series “The Innocence
Files,” INNOCENCE PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2020), https://innocenceproject.org/chester-hollman-facinglife-in-prison-exonerated-of-murder-to-be-featured-in-the-innocence-files/ [https://perma.cc/YE7
S-Y2MT] [hereinafter The Innocence Project Hollman Article].
3. PHILA. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., OVERTURNING CONVICTIONS—AND AN ERA: CONVICTION
INTEGRITY UNIT REPORT JANUARY 2018–JUNE 2021, at 21 (2021), https://github.com/phillydao
/phillydao-public-data/blob/master/docs/reports/Philadelphia%20CIU%20Report%202018%20%202021.pdf [https://perma.cc/L87Q-KRFR].
4. Answer at 1, Commonwealth v. Hollman, No. CP-51-CR0933111-1991 (Ct. Com. Pl.
Crim. Trial Div., June 24, 2019).
5. Id. at 2–3.
6. Id. at 4.
7. PHILA. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., supra note 3, at 21.
8. Id.
9. Answer at 2, Hollman, No. CP-51-CR0933111-1991.
10. PHILA. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., supra note 3, at 21.
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suppression of exculpatory evidence, no disciplinary action was taken
against Roger King.11
Chester Hollman’s story, while shocking, is sadly representative
of many other exoneration stories.12 Between 1989 and 2021, 914 exonerations involved prosecutorial misconduct, the overwhelming
number of which involved Brady violations.13 Indeed, prosecutorial
violation of due process by withholding material exculpatory evidence
has been characterized as an “epidemic.”14 The withholding of exculpatory evidence has been documented in approximately 26 percent of
exoneration cases since 1989,15 making it a notable factor in wrongful
convictions. Brady violations are particularly insidious because the
suppression of exculpatory evidence bears directly on both whether an
innocent defendant may have been convicted and on whether the process used to convict him or her was fair. At the same time, Conviction
Integrity Units, which have full access to the prosecution’s case files,
are in a unique position to locate exculpatory evidence and to find evidence as to whether it had been disclosed. They are in a unique position to both remedy violations and to prevent future ones.
This Article undertakes to explore the issues presented to CIUs in
identifying, rectifying, and preventing serious prosecutorial misconduct, with a specific focus on Brady violations. CIUs are in a unique
position to address the problem of prosecutorial misconduct, and efforts have been made to create best practices for how to navigate the
complexities of CIU investigations of these issues.16 To be sure, The
11. See id. at 36–38. The authors were unable to find any evidence showing that Mr. King was
disciplined.
12. E.g., Maurice Possley, Dennis Allen, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (May 13,
2021), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5559 [https
://perma.cc/B57Y-YF6Q]; see also NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 25,000 YEARS LOST
TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 3 (2021), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Docu
ments/25000%20Years.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S8W-VZG4] (as of June 2021, the amount of time
collectively served by wrongfully convicted individuals surpassed 25,000 years).
13. Exoneration Detail List, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich
.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx [https://perma.cc/SBS5-HETP].
14. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (“There is an epidemic
of Brady violations abroad in the land.”).
15. This percentage is based on cases logged at the time of writing by the National Registry
of Exonerations with both the labels for ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ and ‘withheld exculpatory evidence’ containing instances of prosecutors failing to disclose evidence. See NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, supra note 13.
16. The Quattrone Center released a report in 2021 detailing recommendations on how to deal
with prosecutorial misconduct claims in Pennsylvania. QUATTRONE CTR. FOR THE FAIR ADMIN.
OF JUST., HIDDEN HAZARDS: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIMS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 2000–
2016 (2021), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/11857-hidden-hazards-prosecutorial-miscon
duct-claims-in [https://perma.cc/J6YF-8553] [hereinafter Hidden Hazard Report]. In particular, it
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Quattrone Center at the University of Pennsylvania has provided advice and guidance about how to do so,17 but there has been a dearth of
scholarship on the issue. This Article aims to encourage discussion of
the difficult questions about how such investigations should proceed,
e.g., how should wrongful conviction cases involving Brady claims be
investigated—how should they start, what standard of proof should be
required? If Brady violations are discovered, should CIUs inform the
original prosecutor, interview the prosecutor, call the prosecutor as a
hearing witness, or proceed without the trial prosecutor’s input entirely? If the court finds a Brady violation to have led to a wrongful
conviction, what is the appropriate remedy aside from dismissing the
conviction? What steps should be taken in the office, if any? When, if
ever, should a CIU go outside the office and refer the prosecutor to a
disciplinary body? Should there be a systematic review of other cases
handled by a prosecutor whose misconduct, including Brady violations, surfaced in a review or actually resulted in post-conviction dismissal?
To address these questions we draw on both the Quattrone Center’s work and the published reports and other public information
about how CIUs investigate such claims. Based on four cases in which
Brady violations played center stage, this Article will illustrate the different ways in which CIUs approach these cases and attempt to shed
light on how these questions can be answered.18
Part II of this Article describes the history of CIUs, how they
emerged, how they currently operate, and what best practices are employed to ensure wrongful conviction claims involving prosecutorial
misconduct are being reviewed rigorously. Based largely on the
looked at the emerging role of CIUs in identifying prosecutorial misconduct and recommended
CIUs continue to promote transparency through providing defense counsel/applicants full access
to all prosecutorial files. Id. at 49–50. Whilst guidance was not given directly as to how CIUs should
be navigating these cases, recommendations surrounding automatic reporting of prosecutorial misconduct, enhancing and expanding prosecutorial self-regulation and reporting, and formally reviewing cases of prosecutorial misconduct are certainly instructive to the present discussion. See
id. at 6.
17. Id. at 6.; see also Patricia Cummings, Webinar, The Trials and Tribulations of Discovering
Brady Violations During a CIU Review, https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/1364022652459
193102 [https://perma.cc/4UQT-B724] [hereinafter Cummings Webinar].
18. The misconduct focused on in this Article is predominantly Brady violations and, therefore, is not exhaustive of how CIUs handle claims of prosecutorial misconduct that arise in their
own offices. However, Brady violations appear to be a major category of CIU applications, are
often resolvable based on the prosecution’s own files, and represent a majority of the cases reported
in those annual reports that currently exist. In many ways, though, the discussion here should apply
to other types of prosecutorial misconduct claims as well.
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reported work of the CIUs in Brooklyn, New York; Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Massachusetts; Suffolk County, New York; and Dallas
County, Texas, Part III will look at examples of cases CIUs have handled, cases that involve suppression of exculpatory evidence, and analyze how each CIU investigated and resolved those claims. Part IV
will analyze what the differences between these cases tell us about the
implementation of existing best practices in the process by which
CIUs review claims of Brady violations and about the kinds of remedies available. Part V concludes that current best practices should
more clearly articulate the CIUs’ relationship with the trial prosecutor
in investigating Brady claims and attempts to identify the factors that
should be considered in determining whether to refer a trial prosecutor
to a disciplinary committee and conduct a further review where a prosecutor’s misconduct is identified or results in a post-conviction dismissal.
II. CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNITS
A. History
A Conviction Integrity Unit (CIU), sometimes called a Conviction Review Unit (CRU),19 is a designated unit of a prosecutor’s office
that engages in post-conviction, fact-based investigation and review
of claims of wrongful convictions.20 These units are commonly located within a local District Attorney’s (“DA”) office.21
CIUs first emerged in the early 2000s.22 Dallas County is credited
with having the longest continuously operating CIU,23 having been

19. Some offices choose to name their CIU slightly different names, all of which refer to the
internal unit within a prosecutorial office that re-investigates possible miscarriages of justice. The
term “CIU” will be used synonymously to describe these units.
20. Conviction Integrity Units, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich
.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Conviction-Integrity-Units.aspx [https://perma.cc/C6SD-4PR2].
The term “wrongful conviction” refers to when a convicted individual is found factually innocent
of the crime of which they were convicted.
21. There are a small number of statewide CIUs such as the CIU in Michigan run by the Michigan Attorney General’s office. See id. However, given the greater number of and history behind
DAO CIUs, these units will be the focus when using the term CIU.
22. Id.
23. The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission was created in 2006; however, it functions as an independent government entity and so is not categorized as a CIU. See Warren D. Hynson, North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission: An Institutional Remedy for Actual Innocence
and Wrongful Convictions, 38 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 142, 149 (2016).
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created in 2007.24 The birth of CIUs was the beginning of an evolution
originating from the “innocence movement”25 that was initially
sparked in the late 1980s/early 1990s following the introduction of
DNA testing.26 In 1989, the nation’s first two DNA exonerations took
place: Gary Dotson and David Vasquez.27 In 1992, Barry Scheck and
Peter Neufeld started the Innocence Project.28 The Innocence Project
focused solely on wrongful conviction claims in which DNA was
available.29 In 2007, Craig Watkins, the newly elected DA in Dallas
County, Texas, opened one of the nation’s first CIUs.30
Perhaps as a result of the growing awareness of the reality of
wrongful convictions and of the prosecutor’s unique role in identifying, preventing, and correcting them, in 2008, the American Bar Association (ABA) amended the Model Rules (MR) by adopting MR
3.8(g) and (h), which, for the first time, enumerated a prosecutor’s ethical duties in the face of evidence of a possible wrongful conviction.31
This development further cemented the duty of prosecutors to seek
justice and not merely convict.32 In time, the emergence of the
24. See John Hollway, Conviction Review Units: A National Perspective 10 n.5 (U. Pa. L.
Sch., Pub. L. Legal Theory Rsch. Paper No. 15-41, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2707809
[https://perma.cc/54FU-F35G] (“Two offices, Santa Clara (CA) and Dallas (TX) typically vie for
the title of ‘First CRU.’ Santa Clara set up a nascent CRU in 2004, but it took a one-term hiatus
under a new DA before being reinstated in 2008. Craig Watkins became the DA in Dallas County
(TX) in 2007 and started the longest continuously operating CRU at that time; it is the publicity
this office garnered that gets most of the credit for leading the wave of CRUs that has followed.”).
25. “Innocence movement” refers to when Innocence Organizations first began emerging and
growing in numbers.
26. ROBERT J. NORRIS, EXONERATED: A HISTORY OF THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT 33 (2017)
(documenting how DNA testing was offered to the United States by a company in the United Kingdom in 1987).
27. Dolores Kennedy, Gary Dotson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.u
mich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3186 [https://perma.cc/7FQT-UCVZ]
(story of Gary Dotson); First DNA Exoneration: Gary Dotson, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC CTR. ON
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, https://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/ex
onerations/il/gary-dotson.html [https://perma.cc/Y35J-8MMG] (story of Gary Dotson); David
Vasquez, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/cases/david-vasquez/ [https://perma
.cc/7R6Y-K4QL] (story of David Vasquez).
28. NORRIS, supra note 26, at 55.
29. Id. at 56.
30. Craig Watkins, The Dallas DA’s Conviction Integrity Unit, D MAG. (Jan. 13, 2010, 1:13
PM), https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2010/january/the-dallas-das-convic
tion-integrity-unit/ [https://perma.cc/AP46-MX5S].
31. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(g)–(h) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
32. Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 459 n.156 (2009) (“The provisions build upon the ABA’s historic
commitment to developing polices and standards designed to give concrete meaning to the ‘duty of
prosecutors to seek justice, not merely to convict.’” (quoting AM. BAR. ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, Report 105B to the House of Delegates at 5 (Feb. 2008))).
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progressive prosecutor movement led to the election of more reformminded prosecutors,33 and the number of CIUs has steadily increased.34
Currently there are ninety-three CIUs in the United States,35 an
increase of thirty-four CIUs in the last three years alone.36 Twentyeight states have at least one CIU, with California and New York having the most as of early 2022, at seventeen and fifteen, respectively.37
There is considerable variation among how these units are staffed, the
procedures they use, how they investigate, and how and to whom they
report. This is to be expected given the differences in statutes and procedures across states and in DA offices. However, there are certain
recognized best practices that all CIUs aim to implement to maximize
their effectiveness.
B. Best Practices
In 2002, Innocence Project founders Barry Scheck and Peter
Neufeld first articulated the need for “innocence commissions” that
would investigate wrongful conviction cases to identify causes of
wrongful convictions and remedies for future prevention.38
To date, the only such commission in the United States is the
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC), established
in 2006.39 The NCIIC is an independent government entity that

33. See Sophie Tatum, Progressive Civil Rights Lawyer to Be the Next Philadelphia District
Attorney, CNN (Nov. 8, 2017, 9:59 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/08/politics/larry-krasner
-philadelphia-district-attorney/index.html [https://perma.cc/J9A3-8XM6]; Steve Schmadeke, Kim
Foxx Promises “New Path” of Transparency as Cook County State’s Attorney, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 1,
2016, 6:34 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20210701054730/https:/www.chicagotribune.com
/news/breaking/ct-kim-foxx-states-attorney-met-20161201-story.html. For an in-depth exploration
of progressive DA elections see David A. Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected
Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647 (2017).
34. See Conviction Integrity Units, supra note 20.
35. Id. (calculation includes statewide CIUs and statistics are correct as of February 2022).
36. For 2019 figures, see NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 9
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RF58-2JG6]. For 2021 figures, see Conviction Integrity Units, NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Conviction-Integrity-Units.aspx [https://perma.cc/C6SD-4PR2].
37. See Conviction Integrity Units, supra note 20, for a full list of CIUs.
38. Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of “Innocence Commissions”
in America, 86 JUDICATURE 98, 99 (2002).
39. See Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 492 (2009).
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focuses solely on reviewing claims of factual innocence.40 Consisting
of eight commission members, the NCIIC has the power to investigate
innocence claims through subpoena powers.41 To this end the NCIIC
requires applicants to assert “complete innocence of any criminal responsibility for the felony for which the [applicant] was convicted,”
alongside providing “credible, verifiable evidence of innocence.”42 In
this sense, the NCIIC meets a substantial part of the criteria for an
“innocence commission” purported by Scheck and Neufeld.43
The NCIIC is the only one of its kind in the United States.44 The
lack of further development of this type of commission could be due
to the narrow focus of cases eligible for review. The NCIIC’s sole review of factual innocence claims results in a lack of consideration and
pursual of constitutional problems such as Brady violations and prosecutorial misconduct.45 This is an issue given evidence that such constitutional problems contribute to wrongful convictions and have resulted in the dismissal of convictions.46 As such, the current approach
by the NCIIC greatly limits the number of viable cases for review and,
as a result, the number of applicants who have their cases reviewed.47
Given the large role of CIUs in exonerations,48 it appears that
CIUs have become the favored model for correcting wrongful convictions.49

40. Sarah L. Cooper, Innocence Commissions in America: Ten Years After, in
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 197, 200 (Sarah L. Cooper ed., 2014).
41. Id.
42. Jerome M. Maiatico, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345, 1359 (2007) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1460(1) (Supp. 2006)).
43. Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 100 (“[T]he key, necessary features of an innocence
commission will be subpoena power, access to first-rate investigative resources, and political independence.”).
44. E.g., Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 51, 76 n.142 (2016) (“North Carolina was the first and only state in the country to
establish such an Innocence Inquiry Commission.”); Hynson, supra note 23, at 158 (“As an error
correction innocence commission, the NCIIC is the first and only one of its kind in the United
States.”).
45. Barry C. Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 705, 712
(2017).
46. See supra Part I; infra Part III.
47. This small number of claims reviewed is reflected in the NCIIC’s statistics. Since 2006
the NCIIC has reviewed 2,500 cases. Of those cases only 20 have resulted in exonerations. Cases,
N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, https://innocencecommission-nc.gov/cases/ [https://perma.cc
/D7CT-887A].
48. See infra Part III.
49. Whilst the original term “innocence commissions” centered around the creation of
statewide and federal organizations, such as the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission,
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In 2014 Barry Scheck delivered a lecture in which he articulated
a list of best practices for CIUs50 that has shaped subsequent CIU-bestpractice literature.51 In 2017, Scheck produced an expanded working
document containing this list, which provides best practices for each
area of CIU operation, including CIU’s review of claims of prosecutorial misconduct within their own offices.52 At about the same time,
in 2016, John Hollway of the Quattrone Center at the University of
Pennsylvania, released a report based on interviews with CIU staff that
generated a list of best practices that distinguished operative CIUs
from those that could be said to exist in name only.53 These best practices echo those presented by Scheck, and the two works can be
viewed in tandem as presenting the best practices that all CIUs should
aim to follow.54 They address every step of investigating and analyzing a claim of wrongful conviction, i.e., (1) who can submit an application to the CIU, (2) what criterion CIUs should use for selecting
cases for review, and (3) how the investigation should take place in
regard to information sharing between the CIU and the parties seeking
relief.55
One area addressed by both of the best practices documents is
how to handle claims of prosecutorial misconduct.56 Scheck suggests
a CIU should recuse itself from investigating a claim of prosecutorial

the literature has since expanded to include organizations such as CIUs. See Cooper, supra note 40,
at 206.
50. Scheck, supra note 45, at 705 n.* (“The following is a greatly expanded written version
of the 2014 David H. Bodiker Lecture on Criminal Justice I delivered at The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law on October 7, 2014.”). The best practices were first published in 2015. Barry
Scheck, Conviction Integrity Unit Best Practices, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 15, 2015), https://
www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Conviction-Integrity-Unit.pdf [https://
perma.cc/45AH-C4HE].
51. See Hollway, supra note 24; MASS. CONVICTION INTEGRITY WORKING GRP.,
CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROGRAMS: A GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES FOR PROSECUTORIAL OFFICES
(Mar. 2021),
https://www.massbar.org/docs/default-source/mba-reports/mciwg-guide-to-bestpractices.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4D4-86XX] [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS REPORT]. Similar best
practices were also identified in a report by a task force on wrongful convictions undertaken for the
New York State Bar Association. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 6–10 (Feb. 8, 2019), https://nysba.org/report-on-the-task-force-onwrongful-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/8MST-BWG7].
52. Scheck, supra note 50.
53. Hollway, supra note 24, at 5–7.
54. Scheck, supra note 45, at 707.
55. Scheck, supra note 50. Not every best practice is listed here as this section is meant to
provide only a brief outline of the general best practices CIUs should be implementing. For an
extensive discussion of all best practices, see Scheck, supra note 45, at 720-46 and Hollway, supra
note 24.
56. Scheck, supra note 45, at 731–32.
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misconduct involving current or former members of its office that is
based on “substantial, fact-based allegations.”57 If such allegations are
made, such claims “should be referred to an independent authority for
investigation and review.”58 CIUs have not generally followed this
practice and continue to review these claims themselves based on the
more general best practices covering a CIU’s investigation of wrongful conviction claims.59
Under those practices, once an application for review is received,
best practices suggest CIUs follow a standard procedure.60 The first
step is intake: determining whether the application meets the CIU’s
baseline criteria.61 The criterion used for selecting cases might include
any of the following: facts suggesting a plausible claim of innocence;62
evidence of a constitutional violation;63 or the “interests of justice.”64
Maintaining a broad scope of review for acceptance of an application
maximizes case intake and thus the potential for identification of prosecutorial misconduct and correction of wrongful convictions.65
The next stage is the screening stage. Generally, the screening
stage involves review by an individual in the CIU to establish a minimum level of credibility.66 The standard for review at the screening
stage should also be clear and should not be so high that it will exclude
substantial and potentially meritorious claims from further investigation. The level of flexibility employed at the screening stage is not
without its problems. The more cases eligible for review by the CIU,
the greater the number of resources needed to meet the demand. 67 If
more cases are being accepted for review, more individuals will need
to be staffed in the CIU to review those cases. Not every CIU will have
57. Id. at 731.
58. Id.
59. Scheck, supra note 50; Hollway, supra note 24, at 56–57.
60. See Hollway, supra note 24, at 36–37.
61. Id.
62. Scheck, supra note 50 (“That a defense lawyer could have found [newly discovered] facts
with the exercise of due diligence should not be a bar [to reviewing the case].”).
63. Id. This could include Brady “violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, unfair . . . plea
agreements, [etc.,] which might lead to the vacatur[] of a conviction.” Id.
64. “Interests of justice” is a term used by Scheck to widen the scope of cases that can be
reviewed from the outset by CIUs. This allows CIUs to take on cases where there may be limited
information making it hard to distinguish whether the case is purely an actual innocence case, or
whether there exists a constitutional claim. The CIU can instead look to see if there is any kind of
plausible claim of innocence and proceed with investigation without needing to categorize all new
evidence immediately as “Brady” or proof that defense counsel was ineffective. Id.
65. Hollway, supra note 24, at 35-36.
66. Id. at 37.
67. Hollway, supra note 24, at 35.
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the means to employ a greater number of people and hence may have
to decide between the minimum level of their screening process and
the resources available.68
Once the application passes this stage, the investigation begins.69
The aim of this stage will be to reach a conclusion about the case that
will result in the final or recommendation stage, when the CIU will
present its findings to the DA and put forward its suggested action.70
From there the DA will decide what action should be taken: either applying to a judge to dismiss the charges and release the applicant if
they are incarcerated, conducting a new trial, or simply closing the
investigation.71 An additional consideration is how to address claims
of prosecutorial misconduct internally, for example, to modify training, promotion, and salary practices, particularly when they lead to
dismissal of the charges. A final consideration is whether to refer the
responsible trial prosecutor to a disciplinary committee.
C. Best Practices for Reviewing Brady Claims
1. Investigation: Communication with the Trial Prosecutor
As noted above, the initial standard for reviewing prosecutorial
misconduct claims is a finding of “substantial, fact-based allegations.”72 The misconduct being substantial “denotes a material matter
of clear and weighty importance.”73 It may be possible to resolve the
Brady claim by examining the trial prosecutor’s files, to which the
CIU has complete access, of course.74 If exculpatory evidence is found
there and the defense claims it had not been turned over (and there is
no proof that it had been turned over), that is some reliable proof of
non-disclosure. But one basic question that a CIU must address in reviewing a Brady claim is whether, and if so, how and when, to speak
to the trial prosecutor. The best practice for communicating with the
original trial prosecutor in the case suggests that initial communication
should be limited to (1) professional courtesy and (2) historical

68. Id. (“[A]ttorneys we spoke to struggle with finding an optimal balance between the need
for flexibility in case acceptance and the need to prioritize limited resources.”).
69. Id. at 36–37.
70. Hollway, supra note 24, at 37.
71. Id. at 37.
72. Scheck, supra note 45, at 731.
73. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(l) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
74. Scheck, supra note 50.
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information.75 In addition, however, there have been several cases
where courts have demanded more than a report that the trial prosecutor had been contacted.76 Some courts have refused to dismiss charges
until the trial prosecutor’s “side of the story” is provided either by the
CIU or by calling the trial prosecutor as a witness.77
Patricia Cummings, from the Philadelphia CIU, participated in
two cases in which the decision had been made not to have the trial
prosecutor testify, and in both cases the courts refused to decide the
case until the trial prosecutor was given that opportunity.78 One of the
cases involved Antonio Martinez, who was convicted in 1990 of a
double homicide and sentenced to life imprisonment.79 He applied to
the Philadelphia CIU, which, on the basis of its review of the file found
substantial evidence in the trial records pointing to an alternative suspect that had not been disclosed to the defense.80 The CIU felt confident in agreeing with the applicant that the prosecutor intentionally
withheld this evidence from the defense.81 The CIU did communicate
with the trial prosecutor.82 However, having done so, it believed he
would lie if questioned in court, and the CIU did not call the prosecutor
to testify.83
When the CIU brought the case in federal court, waiving all exhaustion claims, Judge Mitchell S. Goldberg found fault in the CIU’s
decision not to call the trial prosecutor as a witness.84 Judge Goldberg
believed that the trial prosecutor’s testimony was essential and that he
should have the opportunity to meet the allegations.85 Even though the
case was litigated in state court and Martinez was exonerated in that
separate state proceeding,86 the federal court issued a written decision
admonishing Cummings for not calling the trial prosecutor to testify

75. Hollway, supra note 24, at 31; MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 51, at 24.
76. Cummings Webinar, supra note 17.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Martinez v. Delbalso, No. 19-5606, at 2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2021), https://images.law.com
/contrib/content/uploads/documents/402/77513/Martinez_Memorandum-Opinion-on-Candor.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7BX-M4Z6].
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2–3.
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and for bringing the case in federal court but ultimately litigating it in
state court.87
Another example of the controversial decision over whether to
allow the trial prosecutor to testify involves Dennis Allen and Stanley
Mozee, who were convicted in 2000 of murder and both sentenced to
life in prison.88 Their case was investigated by the Dallas CIU, which
found the trial prosecutor had withheld the existence of favorable deals
given to witnesses facing convictions in other crimes in exchange for
their testimonies.89 The CIU believed this evidenced a clear Brady violation, and given difficulties faced in contacting the trial prosecutor,
did not interview the prosecutor or call him to testify.90 Whilst the trial
court exonerated Allen and Mozee, the case was sent to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, where it was then remanded with an order that the
trial prosecutor be given the opportunity to testify about the Brady allegations in an evidentiary hearing.91
As far as can be determined, then, courts and CIUs may have different approaches to communications with the trial prosecutor. Best
practices would seem to indicate that a CIU should reach out to a trial
prosecutor if possible, even when a Brady violation is established by
the trial files. In addition, CIUs should realize that the courts may be
reluctant to dismiss a case without hearing what the prosecutor has to
say, either from the CIU’s own investigation or the prosecutor’s testimony.92 And it makes good sense in terms of credibility for a CIU to
engage the trial prosecutors, when possible, to maximize office buyin. A CIU that is seen as actively seeking the trial prosecutor’s account
of events, rather than focusing solely on what they believe the trial
87. Id. at 22.
88. Stanley Mozee and Dennis Allen Declared “Actually Innocent” After 15 Years in Prison,
INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 10, 2019), https://innocenceproject.org/stanley-mozee-and-dennis-al
len-declared-actually-innocent-after-15-years-in-prison/ [https://perma.cc/6R9G-BUUH].
89. Agreed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Applicants’ Amended Writs of Habeas Corpus at 2, 6, Ex parte Allen, No. WR-56,666-03, Ex parte Mozee, No. WR- 82,467-01 (Tex.
Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/108
7_Mozee-and-Allen-Agreed-Findings-2017-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/27Y5-XTP3] [hereinafter Allen and Mozee Findings].
90. Cummings Webinar, supra note 17.
91. Id. at 7.
92. The present discussion centers around courts requiring the trial prosecutor to testify. However, a decision CIUs may need to consider before taking the case to court is whether they wish to
call the trial prosecutor as a witness. This decision may influence how a CIU communicates with a
prosecutor, as they will need to ascertain the level of information the prosecutor can offer, to what
extent the prosecutor can be trusted to tell the truth, and how their testimony may impact the case.
This decision is important given the possible preference of some courts to have the testimony of
the trial prosecutor or some indication of what the prosecutor says occurred.
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documents indicate, is likely to result in greater credibility for the CIU
as a fact-finding unit focused on discovering the truth, rather than a
unit set out to discredit former and current prosecutors in the office.
Common sense would appear to indicate that an office of ADAs
would have little respect for a dismissal based on Brady where the
prosecutor responsible was not consulted by the CIU. Thus, deterrence
would likely be weak and the ability of the CIU to prevent wrongful
convictions will suffer. Giving the trial prosecutor an opportunity to
consult would generate less resentment and pushback and greater
credibility for the CIU as a fact-finding unit focused on discovering
the truth, rather than a unit set out to discredit former and current prosecutors in the office. Finally, where the misconduct is severe or repeated, it would appear prudent to contact the trial prosecutor if referring them to a disciplinary committee or taking other steps is even
contemplated.
2. The Significance of Mens Rea
There is currently a debate about what role, if any, the mens rea
of the trial prosecutor should play in addressing a claimed Brady violation: whilst not necessary to establish a constitutional Brady violation, should it be considered on the merits or in determining any institutional consequences?
Brady v. Maryland,93 of course, does not itself require a showing
of mens rea to establish a due process violation based on withheld exculpatory evidence.94 Nor do the ABA’s Model Rules require a mens
rea to establish a violation of MR 3.8. Nevertheless, Scheck argues
that a CIU should distinguish between due process violations that result from innocent mistake and intentionally committed misconduct.95
Hollway disagrees and argues that issues of blame should remain separate from the investigation of a wrongful conviction.96 Thus, for
93. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
94. Id. at 87 (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
95. Innocence Project Research Illustrates Lack of Accountability for Prosecutors Who Commit Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Feb. 6, 2012), https://innocenceproject.org/innocence-project-research-illustrates-lack-of-accountability-for-prosecutors-who-commit-misconduct/
[https://perma.cc/TW4B-ZVB9] (“What’s most important is to develop internal and external systems to distinguish between error and misconduct so that prosecutors who make honest mistakes
can avoid them in the future and those few who engage in serious misconduct can be appropriately
sanctioned.”).
96. Hollway, supra note 24, at 57.
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Hollway, the focus of the CIU should remain on deciding if the facts
support a claim of innocence, not on whether the prosecutor’s misconduct was intentional.97 He concludes that “the ability to administer discipline for [misconduct] does not rest within the CRU.”98 In effect, he
would limit the CIU’s investigation to the constitutional merits. As
such, CIUs should remain focused on their primary function as wrongful conviction review units, rather than taking time in their investigations to determine the culpable mental state of the trial prosecutor. It
may be that there is a concern that attention paid to the trial prosecutor’s mens rea will result in adoption of that criteria in addressing the
merits of future claims.
But the intentional or knowing failure to disclose exculpatory information is certainly important to a CIU’s other concerns. In terms of
deterrence or buy-in, other prosecutors in the office are more likely to
accept dismissal of a charge, internal sanctioning of a staff lawyer, or
changes in training or procedures that arise from instances of knowing
or intentional prosecutorial misconduct. And they are definitely less
likely to feel threatened by actions taken in a case of intentional misconduct than in one of arguably excusable misconduct. If the CIU is
in an office where the culture is focused solely or primarily on “winning,” a focus on the most serious and intentional misconduct might
create or strengthen trust in its work.
3. Ethical Issues for the CIUs
With respect to ethical concerns, the first topic that should be addressed is whether any member of the CIU has a conflict of interest
that would warrant their recusal. Such a conflict could arise because
they were involved in the original prosecution or a related one, had a
relationship with the prosecutor who handled the original prosecution,
or were involved in the case or a related case as a defense lawyer.99 As
it is in any legal practice, this is a threshold question that must be resolved before any work is undertaken on the application.
If a violation of the jurisdiction’s ethical rules is found, the decision whether to refer a prosecutor to the disciplinary authorities would
raise the question of whether the CIU has a duty to report under the
jurisdiction’s version of MR 8.3. That duty requires reporting to a
97. Hollway, supra note 24, at 56–57.
98. Id. at 56.
99. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT rr. 1.7, 1.9, 1.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021); see infra Section III.D (discussing the Suffolk County case).
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disciplinary committee where the potential reporter “knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”100 The underlying conduct would generally have to be at least knowing.101 And
certainly, the gravity of non-disclosure is enhanced by its repetition
throughout the case or in other cases. Inadvertent or negligent failure
to disclose would not seem to satisfy that standard.
4. Remedies
A final question CIUs may need to address is what remedies can
be employed following the finding of a Brady violation in a wrongful
conviction case. Specifically, whether the CIU should refer the trial
prosecutor to a disciplinary body or undertake a systematic review of
the cases handled by a prosecutor whose suppression of exculpatory
evidence emerged on review or led to dismissal. There currently are
no best practices concerning these issues.102
i. Referral for Discipline
The suppression of exculpatory evidence violates MR 3.8, a substantial equivalent of which has been adopted in every state.103 MR 3.8
provides:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . .
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.104
In addition, prosecutorial misconduct, and in particular, Brady violations, can violate MR 8.4(d), which prohibits “conduct that is

100. Id. r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
101. Id. rr. 3.3, 3.8, 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
102. See Hollway, supra note 24, at 56–57.
103. Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_pr
ofessional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/.
104. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
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prejudicial to the administration of justice.”105 Conduct that violates
MR 8.4(d) can also violate state rules such as rule 8.4(h) of the New
York Codes Rules and Regulations, which prohibits “other conduct
that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”106 Finally,
knowingly making false representations to the court would violate MR
3.3(a)(1).107 The same misrepresentations to opposing counsel would
violate MR 4.1(a),108 and both would violate MR 8.4(c).109
A lawyer has an ethical duty to report another lawyer’s violation
of the rules of ethics. MR 8.3(a) sets forth a lawyer’s professional duty
to report professional misconduct:
A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the
appropriate professional authority.110
A controversial and complicated question, therefore, is if, and if
so under what circumstances, a CIU has a duty to report prosecutorial
misconduct it discovers in the course of its work.
As noted above, there exists no explicit best practice for lawyers
in a CIU to make this decision. While Hollway takes the position that
“the ability to administer discipline for [misconduct] does not rest
within the CRU,”111 that does not mean that a CIU faced with manifestly unethical conduct should not refer a prosecutor for discipline or
recommend changes in protocol that would prevent future intentional
non-disclosure. Whether the elected district attorney decides to fire or
otherwise sanction a prosecutor found to have committed a serious
Brady violation is a separate decision for the district attorney to make.
That decision-making process could certainly include consultation
with the CIU, which will have a unique perspective on the kinds of
non-disclosure that stand out as serious.
Reporting serious misconduct to a disciplinary committee may be
an appropriate course, but it also may be required by the Rules
105. Id. r. 8.4(d).
106. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2022) (“A lawyer or law firm shall not . .
. engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”); see also
In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d 649, 665 (App. Div. 2020) [hereinafter Matter of Kurtzrock].
107. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
108. Id. r. 4.1(a).
109. Id. r. 8.4(c).
110. Id. r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
111. Hollway, supra note 24.
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themselves. Guidance comes from the ethical obligations set out in the
ethical rules. MR 8.3 requires lawyers who gain knowledge of unethical conduct “that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects [to] inform
the appropriate professional authority.”112 Knowledge of misconduct
is defined as “actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”113 The information
gained from a CIU investigation would appear to establish knowledge.
As with other reporting duties, the question would be whether the unethical conduct “raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.”
Arguably, the ability to fulfill this criterion would be enhanced
through the CIU engaging in greater communication with the trial
prosecutor. While unethical conduct undertaken knowingly may violate the ethics rules, in the absence of recklessness or intentionality,
the existence of a Brady violation may not indicate that the conduct
was knowing or intentional. Demonstrating sufficient gravity to require reporting is unlikely where a non-disclosure, even if material,
may have been a good faith error of judgment.
ii. Conducting a Systematic Review
Whether or not the decision is made to refer, a CIU faced with an
application that raises questions about whether a prosecutor’s disregard of their Brady obligations could have infected other cases handled by that prosecutor should consider whether to undertake some
sort of review of the prosecutor’s other cases. Doing so would be consistent with the CIU’s role in correcting wrongful convictions—in this
case, the wrongful convictions of other defendants who have not applied for relief. It would also be consistent with the CIU’s obligation
to prevent wrongful convictions. A report such as that in the Kurtzrock
case,114 which was released publicly and distributed internally, is
likely to be a more powerful and respected educational tool for impacting what can sometimes be an incorrect institutional approach to
Brady obligations. Interestingly, other institutions whose purpose is to
correct and prevent wrongful convictions have engaged in similar systematic reviews, and in some cases even broader ones. Thus, for
112. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
113. Id. r. 1.0(f).
114. See discussion infra Section III.D.2.ii (discussing “The Broader Review”).
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example, the Criminal Cases Review Commission in the UK has several times conducted a systematic review of cases where a particular
practice led it to refer a case to the court of appeal, which then quashed
(dismissed) the conviction.115 It responded systematically to scientific
developments related to infant death (shaken baby) syndrome and sexual abuse cases,116 and played a significant institutional role in quashing more than thirty convictions that arose from misconduct by the
notorious West Midlands Serious Offense Squad and the Rigg Approach Flying Squad, which ultimately led to those departments being
closed down.117
Among the factors to consider in determining whether to audit
other cases are the seriousness of the misconduct, whether the misconduct was isolated or repeated, the reasons for non-disclosure (to the
extent they reveal a general practice or reflect a misunderstanding of
the law), and the mens rea of the prosecutor.
III. CIU CASES INVOLVING BRADY VIOLATIONS
As demonstrated above, many questions need to be considered in
investigating Brady claims in a wrongful conviction case. This section
analyzes four exoneration cases from four different jurisdictions: the
Dallas CIU, the Brooklyn CRU, the Philadelphia CIU, and the NY
Suffolk County Conviction Integrity Bureau (CIB). These cases were
selected as these CIUs provided significant publicly available information on their cases and processes. All the cases involved the suppression of exculpatory evidence by the trial prosecutor in violation of
Brady, and all resulted in exonerations and dismissal of charges. In
one of the cases, the CIU referred the trial prosecutor for discipline; in
a second, the trial prosecutor was the subject of disciplinary proceedings.118 In the second instance, we analyze those disciplinary proceedings and the CIB’s decision to conduct a systematic review of that trial
prosecutor’s other cases based on prosecutorial misconduct in disclosure.

115. Lissa Griffin, Forensic Evidence and the Court of Appeal for England and Wales, 4 BR.
J. AM. LEG. STUDIES 619, 634 (2015).
116. Id. at 631–36.
117. Lissa Griffin, Correcting Injustice: Studying How the United Kingdom and the United
States Review Claims of Innocence, 41 U. TOLEDO L.R. 107, 126 (2009).
118. It is not clear who referred the prosecutor to the disciplinary committee, and committee
records are confidential. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1240.18(a) (2018).
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A. Dallas CIU: Dennis Allen and Stanley Mozee
In 2000, Dennis Allen and Stanley Mozee were sentenced to life
in prison for the murder of Reverend Jesse Borns, Jr.119 The defendants were tried separately, but Richard E. Jackson (“Jackson”), was
the trial prosecutor in both cases.120 DNA testing did not link either
defendant to the crime and the prosecution relied on witness testimony.121 Importantly, every witness stated that they were given nothing in exchange for testifying.122 Despite Allen and Mozee maintaining their innocence,123 both were convicted and both convictions were
upheld on appeal.124
In 2009, the Dallas CIU, together with the New York and Texas
Innocence Projects began investigating the case.125 As part of the investigation, the CIU reviewed Jackson’s trial file and discovered a vast
number of documents, including letters and police reports, that were
never disclosed to the defense lawyers.126 The Brady violation was
clear from the trial files. The CIU did not interview Jackson, who had
left the office and was difficult to reach, and because it believed there
was clear documentary evidence of a Brady violation.127 In 2014, both
applicants filed new applications for writs of habeas corpus.128 Judge
Mark Stoltz heard the applications and found that the state had suppressed exculpatory evidence regarding two jailhouse informants, in
violation of Brady, by failing to reveal and to correct their false testimony denying any deals had been made in exchange for their testimony.129 Judge Stoltz recommended that their convictions be vacated.130 In line with Texas’s criminal procedure, the cases were
forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals to determine whether that

119. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 95.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Allen and Mozee Findings, supra note 89, at 4.
123. Id. at 5.
124. See Mozee v. State, No. 05-00-01260, 2001 WL 1590524, at *1, *6 (Tex. App. Dec. 14,
2001); Allen v. State, No. 08-00-00442, 2002 WL 1481294, at *1, *12 (Tex. App. July 11, 2002).
125. Possley, supra note 12.
126. Id.
127. Cummings Webinar, supra note 17.
128. Possley, supra note 12. On November 21, 2003, Allen’s first and only prior application
for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. Allen and Mozee Findings, supra note 89, at 5. Mozee had
not filed a prior application for writ. Id.
129. Allen and Mozee Findings, supra note 89, at 6. This violates MR 3.3(a)(3) and 3.8(d).
130. Cummings Webinar, supra note 17.
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decision was correct.131 The Court of Criminal Appeals did not rule on
the merits but instead remanded, directing the trial court to provide
Jackson the opportunity to respond to the applicants’ Brady claim.132
The CIU then spoke with Jackson, who denied having suppressed any
evidence and insisted he wanted to testify.133 When he testified at the
hearing, Jackson recounted his interactions with witnesses.134
One of the witnesses Jackson dealt with was Zane Smith, a jailhouse informant.135 In what has become a standard claim by jailhouse
informants, Smith claimed that Mozee admitted to participating in the
murder with Allen.136 Smith testified, asserting that he had no deal,
agreement, or understanding with Jackson about any criminal
charges.137 However, on examination of Jackson’s trial file, the CIU
found two letters that had been written from Smith to Jackson.138 The
first was written while Smith was in jail awaiting trial on pending felony theft cases, in which he stated he was “willing to testify” against
Mozee.139 Three weeks before Smith later testified at Mozee’s trial,
Smith received a favorable plea and sentence for a third-degree theft
charge that resulted in him spending just 365 days in prison—staggeringly less than the possible twenty years he could have faced.140 The
day after he testified against Mozee, Smith sent a second letter to Jackson seeking confirmation that Jackson would deliver on personally interceding in Smith’s case to reduce his sentence further.141 After both
trials were over, Jackson personally moved to reopen Smith’s case.142
The motion was granted, and Jackson succeeded in reducing Smith’s
sentence even further, from 365 days to 244 days, a sentence he had
already served.143 As a result, Smith was released.144

131. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (West 2021); Cummings Webinar, supra note
17, at 34:40–34:50.
132. Allen and Mozee Findings, supra note 89, at 7.
133. See generally Possley, supra note 12.
134. Discussion of the two jailhouse informants will be focused on here; however, numerous
other witnesses were called, and exculpatory evidence suppressed in relation to deals given in exchange for testimony. See Allen and Mozee Findings, supra note 89, at 27.
135. Id. at 36.
136. Id. at 36–37.
137. Id. at 40.
138. Id. at 38.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 38–39.
141. Id. at 39.
142. Id. at 42.
143. Id. at 42–43.
144. Id. at 43.
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When presented with this evidence at the hearing, Jackson conceded that he did not turn over either of Smith’s letters to either defendant’s counsel.145 Jackson agreed that the second letter was Brady
material, and that he violated his duty to make a timely post-trial disclosure.146
Jackson had similar dealings with a second jailhouse informant.
In Allen’s trial, Lonel Hardeman, a jailhouse informant, testified that
Allen made admissions to him about the murder while both men were
in county jail.147 Like Smith, he insisted numerous times that he neither sought, wanted, nor expected any benefits or assistance from the
State.148 However, during the hearing, Jackson conceded that he knew
of letters Hardeman had sent pleading for the State to dismiss his own
pending robbery cases outright in exchange for his testimony.149 In
fact, transcripts from Hardeman’s robbery cases reveal that Jackson
personally intervened on Hardeman’s behalf in prosecutions being
handled by another colleague.150 As a result, instead of receiving the
mandatory twenty-five years to life on each robbery count, Hardeman
was offered, and accepted, a guilty plea of just three years’ imprisonment on each of his two felony robbery charges.151 This was the same
kind of intercession Jackson undertook for Smith, none of which he
revealed to the defense.
The Court granted the writ of habeas corpus to both applicants,152
finding as to both of them:
[T]here exists compelling documentary and testimonial evidence that the trial prosecutor (1) knowingly presented
and/or failed to correct false testimony at trial, (2) failed to
disclose benefits, promises, agreements, and/or understandings between the State and [at] least four informant witnesses
who had pending criminal charges . . . in Dallas County for
which they sought and received [State] assistance, as well as
. . . notes in the prosecutor’s own file relating to those pretrial
145. Id. at 43–45.
146. Id. at 44. This violates MR 3.3a(3) and 3.8(d).
147. Allen and Mozee Findings, supra note 89, at 17.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 18-19, 31.
150. Id. at 35.
151. Id. It is not clear from the transcript whether the terms ran concurrently, and Hardeman
served only three years for both felony charges, or whether they ran consecutively, and he served
six years. Information on his plea hearing was not accessible. The reduction is significant, nevertheless.
152. Id. at 66.
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discussions and benefits, and (3) failed to disclose favorable
eyewitness evidence.153
On October 25, 2018, the Dallas CIU and the Innocence Project
submitted a grievance complaint against Jackson, requesting the State
Bar of Texas to investigate his conduct in the Allen and Mozee
cases.154 There was no doubt, and the court confirmed it, that the nondisclosure was knowing or intentional.155 The disciplinary complaint156 cited Jackson’s misconduct as a violation of rule 3.09(d) of
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,157 which requires the “timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigates the offense.”158 Historically, state bars routinely
dismiss complaints against prosecutors, and prosecutors are almost
never disciplined.159 Here, however, the State Bar of Texas found that
there was enough evidence to go forward with the investigation, no
doubt impressed by the court’s findings.160 While the investigation
was proceeding,161 Jackson moved to have his resignation from the bar
accepted in lieu of discipline while continuing to deny all the allegations in the pending disciplinary action.162 On April 13, 2021, the Supreme Court of Texas accepted Jackson’s motion for resignation in
lieu of discipline.163

153. Id. at 3–4.
154. Cummings Webinar, supra note 17.
155. Allen and Mozee Findings, supra note 89, at 3–4.
156. Memorandum from Kristin V. Brady, Assistant Disciplinary Couns., to Blake Hawthorne,
Sup. Ct. of Tex. (Apr. 8, 2021), https://images.law.com/contrib/content/uploads/documents/401/52
688/richard-e-Jackson.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM34-ZJ3Z].
157. Id. at 1.
158. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.09(d) (2022).
159. Anthony C. Thompson, Retooling and Coordinating the Approach to Prosecutorial Misconduct, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 623, 650 (2017) (“Unfortunately, in practice, the standard mechanism for review—bar discipline—has proven ineffective.”); Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 276–77 (2007)
(“Even when referrals occur, state bar authorities seldom hold prosecutors accountable for misconduct.”).
160. Cummings Webinar, supra note 17, at 37:40–38:37.
161. The existence of a pending allegation with a correlating rule violation demonstrates that
the Disciplinary Counsel had begun investigation into Jackson’s conduct. See COMM’N FOR LAW.
DISCIPLINE, STATE BAR OF TEX., ANNUAL REPORT: JUNE 1, 2019–MAY 31, 2020, at 16 (2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210201084726/https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Sect
ion=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=41986.
162. Memorandum from Kristin V. Brady, supra note 156, at 1 (“While Applicant vehemently
denies all allegations in the pending disciplinary action, Applicant simply cannot financially afford
to continue to defend himself in this action.”).
163. Disciplinary Actions, 84 TEX. B.J. 544, 545 (2021).
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B. Brooklyn CRU: Gerard Domond
In 1989, Gerard Domond was convicted of murder and sentenced
to twenty-five years to life based on the death of Patrick Hinkson.164
Hinkson had been shot once in the head and had died of his injuries.165
Three days after the shooting, one Francois Pierre walked into the 77th
Precinct police station in Brooklyn and claimed that Domond had shot
Hinkson.166 Shortly thereafter Pierre viewed a photo lineup and identified Domond.167 No witnesses or DNA evidence could be found to
corroborate Pierre’s account and none was presented.168 The State’s
case rested entirely on Pierre’s testimony.169
Before trial, Pierre entered into a cooperation agreement with the
Kings County DA whereby he would testify against Domond in exchange for a guilty plea to his pending narcotics charges with a promised sentence of six months’ jail and five years’ probation instead of a
potential five to fifteen year term of imprisonment.170 Pierre testified
about this deal at trial.171
On May 30, 1989, despite the jury’s knowledge of Pierre’s deal
and the defense calling numerous alibi witnesses, Domond was found
guilty and sentenced to twenty-five years to life.172
Domond’s direct appeal173 and petition for a writ of habeas corpus
were both denied.174 Throughout all the proceedings, Domond
164. Id.
165. Maurice Possley, Gerard Domond, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (July 1, 2021),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5859 [https://perm
a.cc/Z9W6-RNXG].
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Brooklyn District Attorney Moves to Vacate Conviction in 1987 Murder After Finding
That Sole Eyewitness’ Mental Condition Wasn’t Disclosed, DIST. ATT’Y KINGS CNTY. (Oct. 30,
2020), http://www.brooklynda.org/2020/10/30/brooklyn-district-attorney-moves-to-vacate-convic
tion-in-1987-murder-after-finding-that-sole-eyewitness-mental-condition-wasnt-disclosed/ [https:
//perma.cc/6749-CUC3].
170. Possley, supra note 165. In the 1980s, the “Rockefeller drug laws" imposed mandatory
indeterminate sentences for drug offenses. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 2019);
Peter A. Mancuso, Comment, Resentencing After the “Fall” of Rockefeller: The Failure of the
Drug Law Reform Acts of 2004 and 2005 to Remedy the Injustices of New York’s Rockefeller Drug
Laws and the Compromise of 2009, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1535, 1535–36 (2010).
171. CONVICTION REV. UNIT, DIST. ATT’Y KINGS CNTY., REPORT ON THE CONVICTION OF
GERARD DOMOND 10, http://www.brooklynda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Domond-memoCRU-Case.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5KC-A5NV] [hereinafter Domond Memo].
172. Id. at 14.
173. In 1993, the Appellate Division unanimously upheld the conviction. See People v. Domond, 598 N.Y.S.2d 974 (App. Div. 1993).
174. Domond Memo, supra note 171, at 14–15.
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maintained his innocence.175 In 2016, Domond’s attorney sent two letters to the Brooklyn CRU asking that Domond’s case be reviewed.176
The CRU began investigating the case and discovered that before
trial Pierre had been in custody in the Department of Corrections Psychiatric Forensic Unit at Kings County Hospital (KCH) G Building.177
A takeout order, signed by the trial prosecutor, Paul Maggiotto, was
found in the trial file, alongside an undated and unsigned handwritten
note that contained the phrase “psychological” connected to the G
Building of KCH.178 Following this discovery, the CRU learned that
the G Building exclusively housed psychiatric patients and that the
fact of his psychological treatment was Brady impeachment information that had never been disclosed to the defense.179 It also found
that Maggiotto actually misled the jury about the reasons for the witness’s hospitalization, preventing them from evaluating the credibility
of the only witness against the defendant.180
The CRU interviewed Maggiotto by telephone on three occasions.181 In those conversations, he told the CRU that he knew at the
time of trial that the KCH G Building was a psychiatric ward but
claimed he thought Pierre had been suffering from AIDS and surmised
that he was in G Building because he may have attempted suicide.182
There is no indication why Maggiotto assumed the psychiatric commitment was related to any suicidal issue. Moreover, Pierre spent a
full four months in the G Building, and he was not simply placed on
suicide watch or some other suicide prevention program.183 The CRU
interviewed two medical experts who stated that a four-month stay indicated a “very serious mental health condition.”184 The experts stated
that if Pierre had tried to commit suicide, he would not have been committed to the G Building for so long.185
The Brooklyn CRU concluded that Maggiotto had misled the jury
and denied the defense the opportunity to impeach Pierre, regardless
of whether he actually knew why Pierre was in a psychiatric ward or
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17, 20.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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not.186 Since Pierre provided “the only evidence of the defendant’s
guilt,”187 it recommended dismissal.188 On October 30, 2020, Domond
was exonerated.189
There is no public record of any disciplinary action having been
taken against Maggiotto in New York,190 and no other indication can
be found that he was ever referred for disciplinary proceedings regarding this case.191
C. Philadelphia CIU: Walter Ogrod
On October 8, 1996, Walter Ogrod was convicted and sentenced
to death for the murder of four-year-old Barbara Jean Horn.192 The
prosecution contended that Ogrod had beaten her over the head after
trying to sexually assault her.193 Her body was discovered inside a
cardboard television box.194 At least five eyewitnesses told police they
had seen a man carrying or dragging a cardboard box through the
neighborhood on the afternoon Horn was murdered.195 Ogrod lived in
the neighborhood and none of the descriptions of the man with the box
matched Ogrod.196 In a confession that was later claimed to be false
and coerced, Ogrod confessed, but he immediately recanted the confession.197 His confession was placed in evidence.198 The first trial resulted in a mistrial after a juror said in open court that they did not
agree with the majority’s decision to acquit.199 A new prosecutor was
186. Id. at 22, 24. This violates MR 3.3(a)(3) and 3.8(d),
187. Domond Memo, supra note 171, at 23.
188. Id. at 23–24.
189. Possley, supra note 165.
190. Attorney Online Services—Search, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://iapps.courts
.state.ny.us/attorneyservices/search?2 [https://perma.cc/CHE7-4PAT].
191. Reissued Public Censure at 7, In re Maggiotto, No. 09-039 (N.H. Sup. Ct., Sept. 21, 2010),
https://www.nhattyreg.org/assets/1286368628.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5TM-NJCU] (Maggiotto
moved to practice law in Concord New Hampshire in 1990; he received a Public Censure sanction
from the New Hampshire Supreme Court Professional Conduct Committee in 2010 after engaging
in a relationship with a client he was representing in divorce proceedings).
192. Maurice Possley, Walter Ogrod, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Aug. 13, 2021),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5752 [https://perm
a.cc/9RSC-63DG].
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Philadelphia DA’s Report, supra note 4, at 22.
197. Id.
198. Possley, supra note 192.
199. Commonwealth’s Answer to Petition for Postconviction Relief at 7, Commonwealth v.
Ogrod, No. CP-51-CR-0532781-1992 (Ct. Com. Pl. Crim. Trial Div., Feb. 28, 2020) [https://perma
.cc/AQN5-DBHV] [hereinafter Ogrod Answer].
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then appointed to take over the case for the second trial, Judith Rubino.200 During the second trial, the prosecution presented testimony
from a new witness, Jay Wolchansky, a jailhouse informant, who testified for the first time that Ogrod had confessed to him.201 Rubino
claimed there had been no arrangement between the Commonwealth
and Wolchansky in exchange for his testimony.202 At this second trial,
Ogrod was found guilty and sentenced to death.203
In 2018, an investigation by the Philadelphia CIU revealed an extensive record of exculpatory evidence that neither the original trial
prosecutor nor Rubino had disclosed to the defense.204 The first category of exculpatory evidence included exculpatory and impeaching
information that indicated the victim had died from asphyxia and not
from head wounds and that this was known to the ADAs.205 The file
contained handwritten notes that indicated “asphyxiation . . . probably
smothered her.”206 The second included information that corroborated
the defendant’s claim that the detective had testified to a false and unreliable confession.207 The file contained a report of an investigation
into Ogrod’s history that clearly demonstrated he was easily manipulated and would have supported his claim that his confession was coerced.208 This also had not been disclosed to the defense.209 The third
category of exculpatory evidence included information about two jailhouse informants, Hall and Wolchansky. This information—found in
the prosecutor’s files—also demonstrated the confessions were fabricated and established collusion between the two informants.210 It also
revealed Wolchansky’s extensive mental health records, which had
not been disclosed, and the DA’s own belief that he was malingering
in order to avoid prosecution.211 Wolchansky had been cross-examined about his mental health and had denied having any mental health
issues.212 However, Rubino had undisclosed file documents that
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Philadelphia DA’s Report, supra note 4, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Ogrod Answer, supra note 199, at 2–3.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 11–12.
Id.
Id. at 30.
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demonstrated that Wolchansky suffered from mental health problems
that were persistent, severe, and at times psychosis-inducing.213 This
information was not turned over to the defense and Rubino made no
attempt to correct Wolchansky’s testimony that he had no mental
health problems.214
As part of its investigation, the CIU sent a letter to Rubino informing her of its current investigation. It also forwarded items from
the file and asked her to contact the CIU if she had any relevant information or if she wanted to discuss the case.215 Following the letter,
Rubino had several phone call discussions with the CIU.216 She
acknowledged that the handwritten note “asphyxiation . . . probably
smothered her” was hers, that it contradicted the prosecution’s claim
that the victim was beaten following a sexual assault, and that it was
likely made while preparing Rubino’s expert to testify.217 She indicated that based on her knowledge of the case and the conversations
with the CIU she believed that Ogrod should be granted a new trial.218
On June 10, 2020, the Common Pleas Court granted the CIU’s
motion to dismiss the case.219 It appears that the CIU took no action
against either the original trial prosecutor or Rubino, as there is no
public record of any disciplinary action having been taken against either of them and no other indication that either was referred.220
D. N.Y. Suffolk County CIB: Messiah Booker
By an order dated December 30, 2020, Glenn Kurtzrock, an assistant district attorney in the N.Y. Suffolk County DA’s office, was
suspended from practice for two years.221 Three allegations of professional misconduct had been made against him, and each of which was
upheld following an extensive hearing in a Special Referee’s eighty-

213. Id.
214. Id. at 11. This violates MR 3.3(a)(3) and 3.8(d).
215. Ogrod Answer, supra note 199, at 21 n.11.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 21.
218. Id. at 21 n.11.
219. Possley, supra note 192.
220. Judith Frankel Rubino, DISCIPLINARY BD., PA. SUP. CT., https://www.padisciplinary
board.org/for-the-public/find-attorney/attorney-detail/14203 [https://perma.cc/VK67-7R7F].
221. In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d 649, 666 (App. Div. 2020). Unlike our discussion of the
other three cases, we analyze the Booker case in retrospect, based on the Appellate Division’s opinion affirming the findings of the disciplinary committee, where most of the facts surrounding the
underlying wrongful conviction claim are found. We also rely on the report of the Suffolk County
CIB, which undertook a systematic review of Kurtrock’s cases following the court’s decision.
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eight-page report.222 The charges were based on Kurtzrock’s failure to
disclose Brady/Giglio and Rosario materials223 in the homicide case
of People v. Messiah Booker.224 In the underlying Booker case, defense counsel had properly made a series of Brady/Giglio requests to
which Kurtzrock had responded by representing to the court and counsel either that all materials had been turned over or that the People had
complied with their disclosure obligations.225 After extended requests
and motions, followed by orders from the court to turn over additional
materials, defense counsel moved to dismiss in the interests of justice
based on Kurtzrock’s Brady/Giglio and Rosario misconduct.226
On May 9, 2017, the court held a hearing on the issue.227 The
hearing was never completed, because as evidence of Brady/Giglio
and Rosario violations was adduced, the prosecution, in the person of
Kurtzrock’s bureau chief, moved to dismiss the felony murder charge
“based upon the events” at the hearing.228 The prosecution explained
that, in light of the non-disclosures, the People would not be able to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.229 The court recognized the
prosecution’s problem and referred to section 210.40(e) of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law, noting that it “speaks to serious misconduct in the prosecution of the defendant” and that “the record
speaks for itself in that regard.”230 No decision was made on the motion to dismiss, and Booker pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the
second degree and received the agreed-on five-year sentence.231
Kurtzrock resigned from the district attorney’s office that day.232

222. Id. at 651.
223. Id. at 652. In addition to Brady obligations, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),
requires disclosure to the defense of material impeachment information concerning prosecution
witnesses; People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1961), requires disclosure before hearing or
trial of all written or recorded statements made by prosecution witnesses that relate to the subject
matter of their testimony.
224. People v. Booker, Indictment No. 2325A-2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
225. In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d at 652.
226. See id. at 656.
227. Id. at 657.
228. Id. at 653–54.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 658.
231. Id. at 654.
232. Id. at 658.
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Charge one of the petition alleged violation of rule 3.8(b) of the
New York Rules of Professional Conduct.233 The Special Referee
found that Kurtzrock
1. failed to turn over and misleadingly redacted memo book entries,
written reports, and interview notes that identified “John Doe No. 1,”
an alternative suspect, as the perpetrator of the crime;234
2. failed to turn over notes of an interview of a key prosecution witness—the only witness to identify Booker—reflecting that she was
taking strong medication for depression and ADHD at the time of the
crime and interview notes of another person who stated that this same
witness had kept changing her story why the subject premises had
been targeted, several versions of which had nothing to do with
Booker;235
3. failed to turn over records of out of state police activity concerning
Booker’s former girlfriend, who testified as an accomplice.236
Interestingly, the special referee made additional factual findings
of misconduct. In brief, the special referee also found that Kurtzrock
1. had been fully aware of the full contents of the police file, had done
nothing in response to defense counsel’s requests, but simply followed
his practice of relying on the police detectives to alert him to “exculpatory material or something that would be important for [him] to
know” including whether another suspect “is or is not Brady”;237
2. as to Rosario, had reviewed the files concerning the prosecution’s
witnesses and identified materials that were not turned over because
233. Id. at 658–59; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); (N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2017) (“A prosecutor . . . in criminal litigation shall make
timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant or to a defendant who has no counsel of the existence
of evidence or information known to the prosecutor . . . that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the sentence, except when relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of a tribunal.”).
234. In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d at 659. Kurtzrock redacted two years of the detective’s
memo book that included references to the other suspect and in a way that did not reveal the extent
of the redactions. Id. at 656.
235. Id. at 660.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 657.
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of Kurtzrock’s belief that he would not be questioning the witness
about them on direct examination, an erroneously narrow reading of
Rosario requirements;238
3. had made false sworn representations to defense counsel and the
trial court that he had complied with his obligations, because he had
not conducted a Brady review.239
Charge two was based on the same conduct and alleged a violation of rule 8.4(d) (conduct that is “prejudicial to the administration of
justice”).240 Charge three was also based on the same conduct and alleged a violation of rule 8.4(h) (conduct that “adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law”).241
Kurtzrock did not controvert the findings of the special referee
and stated that he took “full responsibility for his failure to properly
perform the duty imposed upon him as a prosecutor.”242
1. The Court’s Decision
All three charges were upheld by the Appellate Division, which
imposed a two-year suspension.243 Noting the case presented “grave
violations of professional standards,” the Appellate Division observed
nonetheless that it was unlikely the misconduct would be repeated
since Kurtzrock had resigned.244 It observed that there was no finding
of “intentional malicious or venal conduct,” recognized Kurtzrock’s
community service and “credible evidence of his reputation and good
character,” and acknowledged that a member of Kurtzrock’s family
had “had a medical issue.”245 Significantly, the court also noted that
“there was no showing that he engaged in any similar conduct in any
other cases notwithstanding the respondent’s assertion to the effect
that he customarily delegated responsibility for compliance with

238. Id. at 656.
239. Id. at 657.
240. Id. at 654; see also RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 2017).
(“A lawyer or firm shall not . . . (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”).
241. In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d at 654; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
§ 1200 (2017).
242. In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d at 651.
243. Id. at 666.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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Brady to the police.”246 Giving weight to what it characterized as “extensive evidence in mitigation,” it imposed a two-year suspension
from practice.247
2. The Systematic Review
i. The First Review
In 2017, after Kurtzrock resigned, prosecutors who had not been
involved in the cases examined the files in eight other homicides in
which Kurtzrock had been lead trial counsel.248 In several of these
cases, documents were identified that the reviewing prosecutor
thought should have been turned over. Pursuant to Brady and Rosario,
several hundred pages of documents were turned over to the relevant
defense attorneys.249
ii. The Broader Review
In 2020, after the Appellate Division’s suspension, and after he
had created the first Conviction Integrity Bureau in the office, DA
Timothy Sini directed the CIB to investigate other cases that had been
handled by Kurtzrock. This decision appears to have been motivated
in part by:
1. The concern, given the evidence in Booker, that Kurtzrock’s
Brady misconduct extended beyond that one case;
2. A concern about the reputation of the DA’s office, since the
prior DA had been convicted of obstruction of justice;

246. Id.
247. Id.
248. SUFFOLK CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF: CONVICTION INTEGRITY BUREAU, A REVIEW OF
THE DISCLOSURE PRACTICES OF FORMER ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY GLENN KURTZROCK 3
(Nov. 23, 2021) [hereinafter Kurtzrock Report], https://suffolkcountyny.gov/Portals/6/DA/PDFs/S
CDAO%20Kurtzrock%20Report%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3KD-VV57]. The CIB had not
yet been created. DA Sini, who was elected as the DA and took office in 2018, created the CIB.
See Press Release, Suffolk Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off., DA Sini Announces Appointments to Conviction Integrity Bureau and Independent Review Panel (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.suffolkcountyny
.gov/da/News-and-Public-Information/Press-Releases/da-sini-announces-appointments-to-convict
ion-integrity-bureau-and-independent-review-panel [https://perma.cc/M5NK-DDBR] (“[The CIB
was] [l]aunched by District Attorney Sini immediately upon his taking office in 2018 . . . .”).
249. University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, Conducting Audits: Suffolk County CIU
and NY Law School Innocence Clinic, YOUTUBE (Feb. 14, 2022) [hereinafter Conducting Case
Audits], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6xq2YPIl3s [https://perma.cc/M5DQ-FRYT].
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3. The Appellate Division’s statement that, in imposing a sanction, it had relied in part on the fact that there had been no evidence of similar misconduct in other cases.250
Sini directed the CIB to address two questions: (1) were any other
defendants’ fair trial rights affected by Kurtzrock’s misconduct, and
(2) if similar misconduct were identified, did the Grievance Committee require additional information given that it had relied on the fact
that “there was ‘no showing that he engaged in any similar conduct in
any other cases’”?251
The CIB’s audit built on the earlier review of Kurtzrock’s cases
from 2017-18, described above. For this more systematic review, the
CIB reexamined each of those cases, but also all cases that Kurtzrock
had tried as an ADA, both as a homicide prosecutor and as part of the
bureau handling non-fatal violent crimes and other felony offenses.252
The fact that the DA’s office had a system for identifying those cases
was obviously an advantage.253 It also examined other cases that
Kurtzrock did not try but in which his pre-trial conduct raised
Brady/Giglio or Rosario concerns.254 The review covered twenty-two
cases.255
As to the cases that had already been reviewed in 2017-18, where
additional materials were identified that should have or might have
been required to be disclosed, discussions were had with DA personnel and defense counsel to ensure that all material had been produced.256 In one of those cases, People v. Shawn Lawrence,257 the CIB
found “dozens” of documents that had not been produced.258 These
disclosures and other serious issues that came to light resulted in a

250. Id.
251. Kurtzrock Report, supra note 248 (quoting the opinion of the court).
252. Id.
253. Conducting Case Audits, supra note 249.
254. See Kurtzrock Report, supra note 248, at 4.
255. Conducting Case Audits, supra note 249. It is worth noting that in one of those cases, a
CIB attorney had to recuse himself because he had been defense counsel in the case. Id.; see also
Kurtzrock Report, supra note 248, at 9 n.6. Each of these cases is discussed in detail in the CIB
report, which was released in November 2021. Kurtzrock Report, supra note 248.
256. Kurtzrock Report, supra note 248, at 3.
257. People v. Lawrence, Indictment No. 1095-12b (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
258. Kurtzrock Report, supra note 248, at 3.
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joint motion with defense counsel to dismiss the indictment against
Lawrence.259
The Suffolk County CIB is part of a partnership with the New
York Law School Post-Conviction Innocence Clinic.260 That partnership is partly supported by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of
Justice Assistance Upholding the Rule of Law and Preventing Wrongful Convictions Program “to review certain applications for relief submitted to the CIB and investigate systemic issues identified by the CIB
or Post-Conviction Innocence Clinic (PCIC).”261 As part of that partnership, the PCIC reviewed the CIB’s report as well as the additional
materials that had been identified as appropriate for further disclosure.262 The PCIC concurred in the disclosure decisions; according to
Craig McElwee, head of the CIB, the partnership was an extremely
helpful collaboration in which the CIB and PCIC agreed on “90 percent of everything.”263 He reported being amazed at the student enthusiasm, thoroughness, and quality of work and appreciated the debate
and discussion.264 The partnership and input from the PCIC also added
legitimacy to the CIB’s work, for example, when it was concluded that
an application presented no grounds for dismissal.265
In addition to reviewing the report, the PCIC also suggested a
broader institutional review to determine if office-wide practices
might have allowed for Kurtzrock’s actions and will be working with
the CIB on ongoing reviews.266
3. Results
“Despite . . . confidence in the verdicts of conviction and negotiated dispositions,” in most cases the CIB disclosed “all non-produced
potential Rosario, Brady, and/or Giglio material” to defense counsel.267 It also included additional material that it deemed might not
259. Id. at 11.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 4.
262. Id.
263. Conducting Case Audits, supra note 249.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. Professor Adele Bernhard runs the New York Law School PCIC. Id. She shared her
enthusiasm for the CIB/PCIC partnership as an educational tool and an effective way to identify
and correct potential wrongful convictions. Id. Among other things, in its work on applications to
the CIB, the relationship enables the PCIC to access documents and other information that would
be difficult to find. Id.
267. Kurtzrock Report, supra note 248, at 6.
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have been required to be disclosed to ensure that the defendants could
effectively evaluate the disclosure issues that the new disclosure might
have raised.268 Disclosures were made in 100 percent of the homicide
cases and 76 percent of all the cases reviewed.269 In one case, this process resulted in the filing of an application for relief under section
440.20(e) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law.270 Other defendants applied to the CIB for relief from their convictions.271 Those cases
are being reviewed, in partnership, in due course.272
Anecdotally, the CIB reports that there has not been a lot of
pushback or hostility to the audit and report from the DA’s office, although there has perhaps been a bit more from the police department.273
Whether due to the Booker/Kurtzrock disclosures or simply part
of the same reform effort, it bears noting that DA Sini undertook other
reforms at about the same time as the events surrounding Booker and
Kurtzrock were taking place:
1. The CIB was created as the first such bureau in the office.
2. Upon assuming office in 2018, the DA adopted a new voluntary disclosure policy. Under that policy Rosario material is disclosed as part of the initial discovery (rather than, as required, on
the eve of trial), unless there is a compelling reason requiring delayed disclosure, and Brady/Giglio compliance is required.274
3. In light of the discovery law reforms in January 2020, the DA
invested substantial resources to ensure compliance and created a
new intake bureau and a new disclosure team to ensure compliance.275
4. A new training regimen was created that involved regular
training on the new law and on Rosario, Brady and Giglio obligations for both newly hired and experienced ADAs. Since 2018

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Conducting Case Audits, supra note 249.
Id.
Id.
Kurtzrock Report, supra note 248, at 7.
Id.
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there have been twelve trainings on discovery obligations as well
as a multi-day training for new hires.276
5. The office now regularly issues bulletins on decisions and updates so ADAs are kept informed of developments.277
6. The CIB’s report was published publicly and distributed internally.278
7. The CIB has undertaken to examine future applications for
similar misconduct and to ensure that those practices do not impact the convictions. In addition, “if any systemic injustices are
identified as a result of the CIB’s and PCIC’s ongoing work, they
will be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities and
the public.”279
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze what these cases tell us about how
Brady claims are handled by CIUs and make suggestions for what best
practices should be adopted. We focus largely on the four main issues
discussed above, i.e., (1) whether to communicate with the trial prosecutor, and if so, when and how; (2) whether mens rea need or should
be investigated or proven, and whether and when a CIU should undertake to prove it; (3) whether a CIU should refer a trial prosecutor to
the disciplinary authorities; and (4) whether a CIU should conduct a
review or systematic audit of other cases handled by a prosecutor
whose Brady violations led to dismissal.
A. Communication with the Trial Prosecutor
In Allen and Mozee, the Dallas CIU did not end up communicating with the trial prosecutor during the course of its investigation;
in the Ogrod and Domond cases, the Brooklyn and Philadelphia CIUs,
respectively, did communicate with the trial prosecutors.
The Dallas CIU did attempt to reach out to Richard Jackson, the
trial prosecutor in the Allen and Mozee cases, during its investigation:
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
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Jackson had since left the office and this made reaching him difficult.280 Moreover, the CIU concluded that it had established a clear
Brady violation and did not need to interview Jackson both because of
the strength of the evidence and the fact that the prosecutor’s mens rea
is irrelevant to Brady.281 However, the court disagreed and refused to
dismiss; instead, it remanded so that Jackson could testify and ordered
the CIU to subpoena him.282 This could have been an idiosyncratic
reaction by the court, but it could also signal the court’s desire to hear
both “sides” explain where constitutionally deficient non-disclosure is
indeed found. If the latter, there may be dangers in allowing the court
to make the decision whether to call the trial prosecutor. First, of
course, human nature being what it is, the prosecutor is unlikely to
confess to unconstitutional and unethical conduct. If called at the insistence of the court, the court could well refuse to vacate the conviction. The hearing court sits as a factfinder and could accept the prosecutor’s version. Moreover, given the momentum to uphold criminal
convictions, and the disinclination of the courts to find prosecutorial
misconduct or even to name an offending prosecutor, allowing the
court to decide whether, and if so how, to make the prosecutor a witness without CIU preparation could seriously backfire.
Conversely, in Domond, Maggiotto was contacted three times
over the phone during which he admitted he knew the building Pierre,
the eye witness upon which the State’s case entirely rested, was staying in was a psychiatric ward.283 Similarly, in Ogrod, Rubino, the trial
prosecutor, was informed of the CIU investigation and after several
phone calls with the CIU asserted her belief that Ogrod should be
granted a new trial.284 Sometimes cooperation between the CIU and
the trial prosecutor can help. And in neither case did a trial court issue
any findings about the non-disclosure and in neither case was the prosecutor referred to disciplinary authorities.
From these cases it seems that best practices would suggest that a
CIU should communicate with the trial prosecutor, even if just as a
matter of professional courtesy, after the CIU’s investigation reveals
that a Brady violation may have occurred. In doing so, the trial prosecutor should be treated as a fact witness. As with any other witness,
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id.
Cummings Webinar, supra note 17.
Domond Memo, supra note 171, at 18.
Ogrod Answer, supra note 199, at 21 n.11.
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the CIU should review all available materials before interviewing the
trial prosecutor and share relevant materials with the witness. At least
anecdotally, courts may require that the trial prosecutor testify at a
hearing before deciding a motion to dismiss.
It is also good practice to speak with the trial prosecutor at some
point in order to assess the deterrent value of a dismissal based on nondisclosure as well as to determine whether reporting is required under
MR 8.3. A prosecutor’s explanation for or reflection on prior Brady
violations may well be relevant to whether the prior misconduct raises
a substantial question about the prosecutor’s ability to practice law and
will certainly impact the deterrent impact of a disciplinary complaint.
There appears to be no uniform approach to communication with the
trial prosecutor. Given the above, there need to be clearer guidelines
relating to what a CIU’s role entails in relation to the level of communication with a prosecutor in a case alleging prosecutorial misconduct.
Such guidelines would also legitimate the CIU’s purpose in the eyes
of the existing ADA staff.
Interestingly, in Allen and Mozee the prosecutor testified at the
hearing after the court insisted on him being produced.285 At least in
that case, requiring the trial prosecutor to testify appears to have made
denial of misconduct more difficult and led to a judicial finding about
that prosecutor’s conduct. In fact, rather damningly in Jackson’s case,
he had to concede on multiple occasions that based on what was found
in his trial file by the CIU’s investigation he had failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence. For example, when Jackson was shown the various letters between himself and two informants (Zane Smith and
Lonel Hardeman) that were in his trial file, he agreed that each constituted Brady material that he was required to disclose in a timely fashion.286 He also agreed that given that the letters were in his trial file,
he must have known about them.287 In Booker, a hearing was held on
the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial misconduct,
which was abruptly halted to permit a reduced guilty plea and after
which the prosecutor resigned.288 While each case needs to be considered on its own facts and merits, it is important to consider the role
that the trial prosecutor plays in the investigation, analysis, and proceedings that lead up to a motion to dismiss.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Allen and Mozee Findings supra note 89, at 27.
Id.
In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d 649, 657–58 (App. Div. 2020).
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B. Considering and Determining Mens Rea
It is clear that a prosecutor’s mens rea is not a necessary part of
establishing a due process Brady violation. For that reason, a prosecutor’s mens rea is not a necessary prerequisite to a CIU’s determination
that a probably innocent defendant was deprived of a fair trial and that
the charge should be dismissed.
But, as noted above, a conclusion that a trial prosecutor knowingly or intentionally withheld exculpatory information or did so on
more than one occasion, is important to the work of the CIU in other
ways. Dismissals based on particularly extreme or egregious misconduct are more likely to be respected by the office and are thus more
likely to lead to deterrence. Most prosecutors do not intentionally
withhold exculpatory information and most prosecutors do not think
they do that. Thus, to the extent a trial prosecutor observes the consequences of intentional non-disclosure, they are more likely to respect
any institutional sanctions or changes in training or protocols that result. Moreover, as far as discipline is concerned, in Allen and Mozee,
the hearing court explicitly found that the trial prosecutor, Jackson,
knowingly withheld a multitude of exculpatory evidence.289 And in
Kurtzrock, where the prosecutor was actually suspended, the special
referee found “a deliberate pattern of avoidance, or willful blindness”
and “deliberate, volitional, and extraordinary actions to attempt to
avoid learning” of Brady material.290 And as far as the CIU lawyers’
duty to report, when deciding when a case demonstrates dishonesty or
unfitness to practice law, the mens rea of the prosecutor becomes pertinent.291
The prosecutors in the Domond and Ogrod cases both failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence, but their mens rea is less clear. They
both violated Brady and the ethical rules.292 Maggiotto failed to determine the real cause for Pierre’s hospitalization and then failed to disclose the fact of the hospitalization itself.293 Rubino’s case is more
disturbing because she replaced a prosecutor who had not disclosed
exculpatory evidence and had a second chance to disclose what was
wrongly withheld.294 Instead she continued to withhold the evidence,
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Allen and Mozee Findings, supra note 89, at 3–4.
In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d 649, 666 (App. Div. 2020).
See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT rr. 3.3(a)(3), 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
Possley, supra note 165, at 4–5.
See supra text accompanying note 204.
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continued to argue for a cause of death that she knew was inaccurate,
and even secured a second jailhouse informant who, it turned out, had
colluded with the first informant and had serious credibility and mental health problems.295 She did not reveal those either, and allowed the
witness to testify that he had no serious mental health issues.296 Despite these facts, there was no finding that her non-disclosure was intentional.297 Depending on the culture of the DA’s office in question,
it may be difficult for a CIU to openly find deliberate and intentional
misconduct, particularly, as discussed above, since that is not necessary to a finding of a Brady violation. Indeed, there was similarly no
finding of intentional misconduct by Maggiotto, who chose to assume,
apparently without any factual foundation or investigation, that his
witness was suicidal rather than mentally compromised. Both of these
prosecutors violated Brady and the ethical rules.298 Another difference
is that in Allen and Mozee, the trial prosecutor denied any wrongdoing;
in contrast, the prosecutor in Domond offered an excuse and the prosecutor in Ogrod, while apparently not offering an excuse, nevertheless
agreed that the conviction should be vacated.
C. Referral for Discipline
Rubino and Maggiotto were not referred to the disciplinary authorities, while Jackson and Kurtzrock were referred.299 Several factors will impact the CIU’s decision whether to refer a prosecutor. The
chief reasons for doing so are to deter and prevent future misconduct
and to promote public trust in the bar and in the criminal process. The
chief reason not to do so is that to the extent the CIU’s investigation
needs cooperation from the office itself, referral will create animosity
and distrust and will make investigation much more difficult in the
future. It will also make staff feel threatened and will prevent respect
for the CIU’s work. In Allen and Mozee, the prosecutor was called to
testify and basically forced to concede his misconduct. This suggests
that key factors in the Dallas CIU’s decision to refer Jackson for

295. Possley, supra note 192, at 6.
296. Id.
297. See supra text accompanying note 220.
298. Domond Memo, supra note 171.
299. It is unclear how Kurtzrock was referred for discipline, but his case is instructive nevertheless. The record is not clear as to who referred him to the disciplinary committee, but it may
have been the court.
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discipline arose from the hearing: his false denials of misconduct, his
admissions, and the court’s explicit finding of misconduct.300
A further difference can be seen in the number of Brady violations
highlighted in each case. The Allen and Mozee case, which involved
the trial prosecutor being referred, involved a series of violations taking place in relation to multiple witnesses and jailhouse informants,
which resulted in a large amount of exculpatory evidence being withheld. The same is true of Kurtzrock, the trial prosecutor in Booker,
where knowing redaction of police documents, suppression of evidence of a third party’s possible guilt, and withholding serious impeachment evidence of essential prosecution witnesses led to discipline. On the other hand, Domond involved the withholding of
important exculpatory evidence, albeit about the sole prosecution witness, where the prosecutor had failed to determine the exculpatory
value of the evidence. This difference is significant as the greater the
number of Brady violations, the more prejudicial it can be and the
more deliberate and more unethical the conduct appears. Patterns of
non-disclosure rather than isolated failures generally make the misconduct less likely to be a mistake or a matter of judgment.301 The
300. This is evidenced further by the infamous case of Ken Anderson. Daniele Selby, Only One
Prosecutor Has Ever Been Jailed for Misconduct Leading to a Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (Nov. 11, 2020), https://innocenceproject.org/ken-anderson-michael-morton-prosecutor
ial-misconduct-jail/ [https://perma.cc/9BSE-8TD7]. Ken Anderson is the only prosecutor to receive
jail time for prosecutorial misconduct that led to a wrongful conviction, and crucially, he testified
in court. Id. His misconduct led to the wrongful conviction of Michael Morton in 1987 who was
exonerated after the Innocence Project found exculpatory evidence had been concealed from Morton’s defense team. Id. Upon this discovery, the Innocence Project filed a petition urging an investigation into Anderson’s misconduct. Id. This led to the Texas Supreme Court ordering a rare Court
of Inquiry that ruled there to be probable cause that Anderson had violated criminal laws by concealing evidence and charged him with criminal contempt and tampering with evidence. Id. Anderson pled guilty to contempt of court, permanently surrendered his law license, and was sentenced
to 10 days’ jail time. Id. Despite not being a CIU case, it does demonstrate how a trial prosecutor
testifying about a potential Brady violation aided in proving misconduct had occurred and resulted
in discipline. This supports the notion that requiring a prosecutor to testify may increase the likelihood of disciplinary action.
301. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“An apparently
isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can
uncover.”). This suggests that a known instance of misconduct can be an indicator of further misconduct. This has been evidenced by CIUs who, upon finding misconduct in one case, have reviewed other cases by that prosecutor and discovered further misconduct. See Kurtzrock Report,
supra note 248 (report details a pattern of nondisclosure in multiple cases in which the prosecutor
committed misconduct); see also Hidden Hazard Report supra note 11, at 55 (“Notably, four of
those 23 [Philadelphia CIU exoneration cases] were prosecuted by the same prosecutor: Roger
King. In addition to those four exonerations, a recent Philadelphia Inquirer report found three additional convictions in which King was the lead prosecutor that were reversed, at least in part,
because of prosecutorial misconduct.”).
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existence of a pattern of misconduct would present a stronger case in
relation to MR 8.3 and to MR 8.4 violations as prejudicial to the administration of justice, not to mention New York’s rule 8.4(h) (conduct that “adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law”).
As noted above, MR 8.3 requires lawyers who gain knowledge of
substantial misconduct to report it to the appropriate professional authority.302 Arguably, a CIU gains ‘actual knowledge’ of the misconduct through its investigation and certainly through the in-court testimony of the prosecutor and the court’s holding, as occurred with
Richard Jackson and Ken Anderson. This knowledge will be supplemented by the CIU’s having proof of a pattern of Brady violations
either in the case being reviewed or after an audit of other cases, which
demonstrates not an isolated or negligent error of judgment but the
intentionality of the misconduct. Thus, through the establishment of a
pattern of misconduct, as in Allen and Mozee and Booker, and an official recognition of the seriousness of the misconduct, a CIU has solid
footing for reporting a prosecutor’s misconduct under MR 8.3.303
In this sense CIUs have the ability to become internal regulators
of prosecutorial misconduct within DAs’ offices. This is especially
true if they can establish criteria for referral or systematic review that
could be consistently applied. Of course, on the other hand, a CIU’s
choice to pursue proceedings against a current or former prosecutor
can lead to serious problems in effectively performing their core function of correcting wrongful convictions.
Push-back. Trial prosecutors may view a CIU as a body determined to find misconduct and to freely second-guess decisions made
by the prosecutors at trial. Often prosecutor sensitivity can be a barrier
to the effective operation of a CIU.304 A case involving Brady violations may present serious risks in this regard as illustrated by a recent
case in Philadelphia. The Philadelphia CIU sought dismissal of a conviction based on a clear Brady violation but the reaction from the prosecutors was to insist that nothing was withheld because “the evidence

302. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer who knows
that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules . . . that raises a substantial question as
to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer . . . shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.”).
303. Arguably this occurred in the Booker case, where, although no decision was reached on
the motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial misconduct, the court noted that the record of serious
misconduct “speaks for itself.” In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d 649, 658 (App. Div. 2020).
304. Hollway, supra note 24, at 31.
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overwhelmingly established” the defendant’s guilt.305 Another prosecutor insisted that the office never reveals prior inconsistent statements of witnesses.306 In this sense, it behooves a CIU to refer a prosecutor for discipline only when faced with egregious—perhaps
systematic and intentional—non-disclosure. It is also important that
the CIU not be seen as a disciplinary body in itself—or as a body motivated to punish prosecutors.
Alienation. One CIU Chief reported that the CIU staff can end up
being viewed as “the guy who killed Superman.”307 Historically, DA
offices promoted a tough-on-crime approach and prosecutors with
high conviction rates were celebrated.308 Therefore, despite the election of a reform-minded DA, the office ethos may value the win-atmost-costs prosecutor and remain skeptical of the CIU.309 This resentment and suspicion could be further exacerbated if CIU staff do not
engage the trial prosecutors in their investigations and almost certainly
if CIUs begin to regularly file grievances against prosecutors.
However, the progressive movement, with its election of more
progressive prosecutors, may have begun to change the ethos of some
prosecutors’ offices toward an awareness that being a prosecutor is
about justice, not solely about winning.310 There is no data to support
that though, and some so-called progressive prosecutors have received
substantial pushback in attempting cultural change.311 As a result, CIU
305. Samantha Melamed, Philadelphia DA Says Prosecutors Hid Evidence for Years in a 2003
Murder Case, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphia-dakrasner-lavar-brown-prosecutorial-misconduct-conflict-20211115.html [https://perma.cc/K8YK-F
EYR].
306. Id.
307. Philadelphia DA’s Report, supra note 4, at 14.
308. DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICAN’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 13 (2012).
309. Philadelphia DA Report, supra note 4, at 14.
310. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
311. Anita Chabria & James Queally, ‘It’s a Showdown’: California District Attorneys Battle
Over Criminal Justice Reforms, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2021, 8:34 PM), https://www.latimes.com/cali
fornia/story/2021-02-08/california-district-attorneys-battle-gascon-policies [https://perma.cc/WC4
H-Y4DW] (“[M]any of the state’s old guard of district attorneys are openly sparring with reformer
colleagues . . . .”); Akela Lacy & Ryan Grim, Pennsylvania Lawmakers Move to Strip Reformist
Prosecutor Larry Krasner of Authority, INTERCEPT (July 8, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://theinterce
pt.com/2019/07/08/da-larry-krasner-pennsylvania-attorney-general/ [https://perma.cc/RN93-KD2
4] (discussing Pennsylvania’s passage of legislation that allows the state attorney to bring charges
where progressive district attorney chooses not to); Linhchi Nguyen & Carlin Ross, Progressive
Prosecutor Series: Boston Progressive DA Faces Pushback in Policies by Opponents, DAVIS
VANGUARD (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.davisvanguard.org/2021/01/progressive-prosecutor-s
eries-boston-progressive-da-faces-pushback-in-policies-by-opponents/ [https://perma.cc/VDH8-G
WX6] (citing pushback on a district attorney’s policy dismissing low-level misdemeanor charges).
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staff may not be ostracized, or at least ostracized less, once more prosecutors become comfortable with scrutinizing their work and accepting accountability where egregious misconduct has occurred.
D. Conducting a Systematic Audit
Reviewing other cases for a prosecutor’s Brady violations or
other misconduct is extremely time consuming and expensive.312 Not
every case in which a dismissal is based on a prosecutor’s Brady violations will warrant that kind of investment. But when a CIU’s review
gives reason to believe that the prosecutor in question engaged in a
pattern of repeated Brady violations that raise a question of whether
such violations would appear in other cases, a review of the prosecutor’s other cases may be an excellent way to fulfill the CIU’s duty to
correct and prevent wrongful convictions based on Brady.313
The Booker case is an excellent example. The Booker record revealed repeated Brady and Rosario violations that not only were
clearly knowingly made,314 but also egregious and repeated violations.
This evidence raised a question about whether the same misconduct
had occurred in the many other cases Kurtzrock had handled either as
trial prosecutor or before trial. In addition, the explanations offered to
the court by Kurtzrock made the likelihood of repetition of the misconduct clear. First, it was clear that Kurtzrock was aware of material
that should have been disclosed but was not.315 Importantly, he also
admitted that his practice was to rely on the police to identify Brady
materials for him316 in contradiction to clear Supreme Court authority
making the prosecutor responsible for police disclosure, not the other
312. Conducting Case Audits, supra note 249.
313. This sort of systematic audit is not new to wrongful conviction bodies. The Kings County,
Brooklyn CIU famously audited cases involving disgraced homicide detective Louis Scarcella.
This was sparked by reporters reviewing dozens of cases involving Scarcella revealing a pattern of
misconduct. See Scheck supra note 50, at 720–22; Frances Robles & N. R. Kleinfield, Review of
50 Brooklyn Murder Cases Ordered, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013
/05/12/nyregion/doubts-about-detective-haunt-50-murder-cases.html [https://perma.cc/WSF9-P6
A8]; QUATTRONE CTR. FOR THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., Guidelines for Collaboration and Engagement: Prosecutors and Defense Counsel Working Together in Joint Post-Conviction Investigations
(Mar. 2022), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/12062-guidelines-for-collaboration-and-engage
ment [https://perma.cc/857S-G6ZR].
314. In re Kurtzrock, 138 N.Y.S.3d 649, 657 (App. Div. 2020). For example, two years of notes
that included the identification of a different suspect were redacted, important impeachment evidence—in one case relating to the only identifying witness—was repeatedly withheld. Id. All along,
Kurtzrock was representing that he had complied with his Brady obligations. Id.
315. Id. at 656.
316. Id.
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way around.317 He also testified that he did not disclose prior statements of prosecution witnesses as required by People v. Rosario318
and Giglio v. United States,319 on the basis that they did not relate to
the questions he would be asking those witnesses on direct examination.320 This was a deliberate and erroneously narrow view of his obligations. Thus, to the extent that he engaged in “deliberate, volitional”321 failure to fulfill his Brady obligations that was based on
articulated systematic and unconstitutional interpretations of his disclosure obligations, there was good reason to believe it had occurred
in other cases.
As noted, an audit or systematic review of other cases by a prosecutor takes time and resources. Once a decision to audit is made, an
essential requirement is, as well, that a DA’s office have a systematic
way to identify cases by a prosecutor’s name. Suffolk County was able
to do that. A first step, then, would be creating such a system if one
does not exist. Second, CIU staff must make sure to account for any
conflicts of interest arising from their pre-CIB employment and should
recuse themselves where necessary. Finally, partnering with an innocence project or law school clinic will not only lighten the workload
and speed up the process, but it will also add a perspective that may
not otherwise be available and foster greater legitimacy to the outcomes.
Equally important, as it was in Suffolk County, where they also
had a newly-elected DA intent on discovery reform, the review and
systematic audit resulted in enhanced review of CIB applications with
an eye out for “red flags,” signaling possible repeat offenders that can
be recorded and considered for audit or review. It also resulted in important internal changes in the DA’s office beyond the correction of
the specific wrongful convictions, including enhanced training, information sharing, and greater awareness of discovery obligations.
V. CONCLUSION
Handling Brady claims presents many unique challenges to a
CIU. Yet CIUs have a unique opportunity to identify, rectify, and prevent the most serious violations: they have unique access to the
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prosecutor’s files, which often makes the claim relatively simple to
prove, and aids the investigative staff in uncovering what occurred,
sometimes decades earlier. Current best practices do not clearly address CIU investigations of Brady and other misconduct claims.
Whilst this Article is not intended to be exhaustive of practices that
CIUs should utilize when handling such allegations, by using example
cases involving Brady violations, this Article may lay the groundwork
for newly created CIUs and for articulating best practices that would
permit CIUs to more effectively serve their role in correcting and preventing wrongful convictions.
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